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I. INTRODUCTION
Hell is paved with good intentions.,
The Missouri Supreme Court has taken Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure2 (hereinafter "Rule 11"), trimmed away some inconsequen-
tial language3, and come up with new Rule 55.03 of the Missouri Rules of
Civil Procedure4 (hereinafter "Rule 55.03"). The result might well be "hell"
1. J. Ray, English Proverbs (1670), BARmTTr's FAmujAR QUOTATIONS (E.
Morison 15th ed. 1980).
2. FED. R. Crv. P. 11.
3. The deleted sentence: "The rule in equity that the averments of an answer
under oath must be overcome by the testimony of two witnesses or of one witness
sustained by corroborating circumstances is abolished." FED. R. Crv. P. 11.
4. The new Rule 55.03 provides:
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an
attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual
1
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for those inclined to play fast and loose with the litigation process in Mis-
souri.
Rule 55.03 represents an escalation in the battle against abusive or
groundless litigation, but it is by no means the first volley fired. It is not
novel to suggest that there should be something to complain about before a
complaint is pursued in court. The Missouri Supreme Court Rules, for ex-
ample, have exhibited a longstanding hostility toward baseless or vexatious
litigation. Missouri Supreme Court Rule 4 formerly incorporated the Code
of Professional Responsibility, which forbids attorneys from engaging in
harassing or malicious litigation and from knowingly asserting groundless
claims or defenses.5 Presently, Rule 4 incorporates the Rules of Professional
Conduct, which includes an arguably broader admonition 6 condemning friv-
olous litigation.7 Additionally, Rule 84.19 of the Missouri Rules of Civil
name, whose address shall be stated. A party who is not represented by an
attorney shall sign his pleading, motion, or other paper and state his address.
Except when otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings
need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. The signature of an at-
torney or party constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading,
motion, or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and
belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is
warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, mod-
ification, or reversal of existing law; and that it is not interposed for any
improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless
increase in the cost of litigation. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is
not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission
is called to the attention of the pleader or movant. If a pleading, motion,
or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion,
or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a
represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an
order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable
expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other
paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
Mo. R. Civ. P. 55.03.
5. Disciplinary Rule 7-102(A) (1978) reads:
In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not: (1) File a suit, assert a
position, conduct a defense, delay a trial, or take other action on behalf of
his client when he knows or when it is obvious that such action would serve
merely to harass or maliciously injure another. (2) Knowingly advance a
claim or defense that is unwarranted under existing law, except that he may
advance such claim or defense if it can be supported by good faith argument
for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.
Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 4 (1978).
6. MoDEL RULE OF PROFEsSIONAL CoNDucT Rule 3.1 (1983); Mo. Sup. CT.
R. 4 (1986), employs an objective benchmark in determining whether claims and
contentions are meritorious. In contrast, DR 7-102 (A)(1) is violated only when an
attorney "knows or when it is obvious" that the issue or claim is frivolous. Mo.
Sup. CT. R. 4 (1978). Moreover, DR 7-102(A)(1) condemns litigation that is advanced
"merely to harass or maliciously injure another" while Model Rule 3.1 prohibits any
"frivolous" basis for litigation. The latter definition of improper litigation expands
the definition found in DR 7-102(A)(1), Mo. Sup. CT. R. 4 (1978).
7. Rule 3.1 Meritorious Claims and Contentions:
A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an
[Vol. 52
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Procedure authorizes damages for a respondent when an appeal is deemed
frivolous." The state supreme court has concluded that an appeal is "frivo-
lous" when it "presents no justiciable question and is so readily recognizable
as devoid of merit on the face of the record that there is little prospect for
success." 9
State statutes and case law exhibit a similar intolerance for groundless
or abusive litigation. Section 514.205, enacted in 1985, awards costs and
attorney's fees where litigation is found to have been pursued frivolously and
in bad faith. 10 Moreover, Missouri case law has long recognized the courts'
inherent power to control the conduct of litigation, and to award attorney's
fees "when a court of equity finds it necessary to adjudge them in order to
balance the benefits.""' This inherent power is separate and apart from any
contractual or statutory provisions.'
2
Still, Rule 55.03 is a breed apart from what has gone before. Unlike
Missouri Supreme Court Rule 4, Section 514.205, and Rule 84.19 of the
Missouri Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 55.03 applies to both parties and
their lawyers. 3 Moreover, the threshold for triggering sanctions is lower
issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous, which
includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal
of existing law.
Mo. Sun'. CT. R. 4.
8. Rule 84.19 of the Missouri Rules of Civil Procedure provides: "If an
appellate court shall determine that an appeal is frivolous it may award damages to
the respondent as the court shall deem just and proper." Mo. R. Crv. P. 84.19.
9. Means v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 550 S.W.2d 780, 789 (Mo. 1977) (en
banc); see also Ohlendorf v. Feinstein, 697 S.W.2d 553, 559 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985);
Goodloe v. Pink, 683 S.W.2d 653, 656 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
10. Section 514.205.1 provides:
In any civil action or part of a civil action pending before any division of
any court of this state including the probate division of the circuit court, if
the court finds after a hearing for such purpose that the cause was initiated,
or a defense was asserted, or a motion was filed, or any proceeding therein
was had frivolously and in bad faith, the court shall require the party who
initiated such cause, asserted such defense, filed such motion, or caused such
proceeding to be had to pay the other party named in such action the amount
of costs attributable thereto and the reasonable expenses incurred by the
party opposing such cause, defense, motion, or proceeding, including rea-
sonable attorney's fees and compensation of said party for the time reason-
ably required of the party to oppose such cause, defense, motion, or
proceeding. Nothing in this section shall be construed as creating any liability
on the part of any attorney representing a party in the proceeding who in
good faith acted at the specific direction of his client in initiating the case,
asserting the defense, filing the motion, or causing the proceeding to be had.
Mo. RFv. STAT. § 514.205.1 (1986).
11. Arnold v. Edelrnan, 392 S.W.2d 231, 239 (Mo. 1965); see also Moore v.
City of Pacific, 534 S.W.2d 486, 505 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976).
12. A discussion of the courts' inherent power to award attorney's fees is
found in Middleton, To the Victor, the Spoils: Proposal to Abandon the American
Rule, 41 J. Mo. BAR 79, 81 (Mar. 1985).
13. The Rules of Professional Conduct incorporated into Missouri Supreme
Court Rule 4 are directed only at attorneys and not their clients. Conversely, Section
1987]
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under Rule 55.03. Unlike section 514.205, Rule 55.03 does not require sub-
jective bad faith before sanctions may be imposed. 4 Unlike the case law,
55.03 does not require a balancing of the equities. 5 In contrast to Rule 84.19
of the Missouri Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 55.03 is presently undimin-
ished by any judicial gloss limiting its applicability to egregious circumstan-
ces.' 6 Finally, the arena in which Rule 55.03 operates is broader than either
Supreme Court Rule 4 or Rule 84.19 of the Missouri Rules of Civil Procedure.
Supreme Court Rule 4's reach is restricted to professional discipline of prac-
titioners, but Rule 55.03 mandates sanctions which may include costs and
attorney's fees. 17 Rule 84.19 of the Missouri Rules of Civil Procedure is
concerned only with appeals, whereas Rule 55.03 applies to any litigation.
Rule 55.03 should make litigants uneasy not only because of its uncom-
promising language, but also because it has only recently been left at the
doorstep. Effective July 1, 1986, there has been little time for case law to
give even initial soundings as to its import. Will Missouri courts welcome its
appearance or allow the new rule to atrophy through inattention? The Mis-
souri Supreme Court adopted Rule 55.03 only after it was reviewed by an
advisory committee, but no notes of the supreme court or the advisory com-
mittee have been published to guide litigants as to its meaning. The drafters'
intent can only be gleaned from the text of the rule itself. Thus, Missouri
courts have a clean slate with which to work in implementing Rule 55.03.
However, those dealing with and subject to the new rule are not left in
totally uncharted waters. As noted at the outset, Rule 55.03 is nearly identical
to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Although Rule 11 is also
a relative newcomer, 8 it was accompanied by the Notes of the Advisory
Committee on the Rules to flesh out its provisions. Equally instructive is the
case law that has grown up around Rule 11 in the short time since its im-
514.205 expressly exempts lawyers while imposing sanctions upon their clients: "[A]ny
attorney representing a party in the proceeding who in good faith acted at the specific
direction of his client" is exempt from liability. Mo. REv. STAT. § 514.205 (1986).
While the text of Rule 84.19 does not restrict its scope to parties, a recent survey
found no cases where a lawyer was ordered to pay damages for a violation of Rule
84.19. See Gray, Sanctions Against Attorneys for Frivolous Filings, 42 J. Mo. BAR
391, 392 (Sept. 1986).
14. Section 514.205 requires that an action be taken "frivolously and in bad
faith" before sanctions may be imposed. Mo. REv. STAT. § 514.205 (1986).
15. See supra note 11.
16. "The remedy provided in Rule 84.19 is both drastic and unusual and
should accordingly be reserved for those rare and unusual situations where its ap-
plication is warranted." Means v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 550 S.W.2d 780, 789 (Mo.
1977) (en banc).
17. The drafters of Rule 3.1 explain in the Code Comparison, Mo. Sup. CT.
R. 4, that their intent was to create an objective standard, but only Rule 55.03 has
mandatory language that sanctions "shall" be imposed when the standard is violated.
Mo. R. Civ. P. 55.03.
18. Rule 11 became effective August 1, 1983.
[Vol. 52
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plementation. Rule 11 has not been ignored. Indeed, one commentator notes
that "we have experienced a flood of decisions in which courts have used
Rule 11 to sanction lawyers and parties." 19 The growing case law, though
still unsettled, permits some tentative conclusions regarding the federal rule's
application. In turn, those conclusions can shed some, albeit imperfect, light
on how Rule 55.03 might be interpreted and applied in Missouri courts. This
transferability of Rule 11 analysis to Rule 55.03 is based on two assumptions.
First, the texts of the two rules are identical with the exception of one sentence
omitted in Rule 55.03, and the language is relatively straightforward. Thus,
where the federal courts have reached a consensus in interpreting the lan-
guage, it is unlikely that Missouri courts will depart significantly from that
interpretation. Second, the Missouri Supreme Court and its advisory com-
mittee could not have been unaware of the federal courts' interpretation of
Rule 11. It can be assumed that the supreme court would have steered clear
of the language of Rule 11 to avoid the unwanted weight of federal case law
if it was in disagreement with that case law. It should be further noted that
the state supreme court will have the final say concerning the meaning of
the state rule. Thus, the state supreme court is in a position to ensure that
the interpretation it shares with the federal courts is the interpretation that
will prevail in Missouri.
The thrust of this Comment, then, will be to survey case law and com-
mentary on Rule 11, with an eye towards more clearly understanding Rule
55.03 as well. Where Rule 11 is discussed, the analysis also applies to the
language of Rule 55.03. The discussion will be divided into two broad areas:
(1) the standards of Rule 11 and Rule 55.03; and (2) the sanctions of Rule
11 and Rule 55.03.
II. TBE STANDARDS
A. Who Must Measure Up?
Neither Rule 11 nor Rule 55.03 plays favorites and neither leaves room
for passing the buck. Both rules apply to parties, whether represented by
counsel or not, and to attorneys responsible for a filing. 20
19. Hall, Unconscionable Delays: Discovery and Rule 11 Abuses, 108 F.R.D.
486, 489 (1985).
20. Rule 11 expressly includes both represented and unrepresented parties
within its scope. Papers of represented parties "shall be signed by one attorney of
record" and "[a] party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign" whatever
papers are filed. FED. R. CIrv. P. 11. Rule ll's application to an attorney responsible
for, but not signing, a filing is less obvious, but case law may support it. See Golden
Eagle Distributing Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 103 F.R.D. 124 (N.D. Cal. 1984),
rev'd, 801 F.2d 1531 (9th Cir. 1986). In Golden Eagle, the district court imposed
sanctions on an out of state firm who had prepared a motion to dismiss. Id at 129.
19871
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The Advisory Committee's note explains that even though the standards
of Rule 11 apply to unrepresented parties, the courts may consider that the
party is without counsel in measuring that party's conduct of the litigation. 2'
A district court apparently exercised its discretion in dealing with a pro se
plaintiff in Bigalk v. Federal Land Bank Ass'n of Rochester.22 In Bigalk, the
farmer's form complaint was meritless on its face. It was nearly identical to
other form complaints that had been filed by other farmers in vain attempts
to stop loan foreclosure proceedings. The opposing counsel provided the pro
se plaintiff with case law from the same district showing the futility of the
form complaint, but the unrepresented party persisted. Nevertheless, the dis-
trict court declined to impose sanctions after granting the defendant bank's
summary judgment motion. The court explained that the pro se litigant's
efforts appeared sincere, and the farmer had been unable to obtain counsel. 23
The special circumstances of pro se litigants were found less compelling
in two cases in the Seventh Circuit. Sanctions were imposed against the
plaintiffs in both Hilgeford v. Peoples Bank24 and Nixon v. Individual Head
of St. Joseph Mortgage Company.5 Plaintiffs in both cases claimed priority
over a foreclosing mortgagee on the basis of a "federal land patent." The
Northern District of Indiana dismissed the Hilgeford complaint sua sponte
for lack of a federal question, but continued in dictum that the so-called
"federal land patent" was blatantly insufficient.26 Turning to the issue of
sanctions, the court noted that it had previously made clear to the same pro
se plaintiffs in an earlier action that the "federal land patent" claim failed
to allege a federal question. The court also worried that more "federal land
patents" would be coming its way if sanctions were not imposed. 27 The end
result - a $250 sanction imposed against the pro se plaintiffs.
The local council who signed the brief were criticized, but were not sanctioned because
they had not participated in the filing or preparation of the motion. Id at 125 n. 1.
This decision was reversed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals on the grounds
that Rule 11 did not mandate sanctions on a finding that a particular argument in a
nonfrivolous motion is unjustified and did not address failure to cite adverse au-
thority. 801 F.2d at 1540. The court did not specifically address the issue of whether
sanctions were justifiably imposed on an attorney who did not sign the motion.
21. The Advisory Committee's note explains: "Although the standard is the
same for unrepresented parties, who are obliged themselves to sign the pleadings, the
court has sufficient discretion to take account of special circumstances that often
arise in pro se situations." FED. R. Cry. P. 11 advisory committee's note.
22. 107 F.R.D. 210 (D. Minn. 1985).
23. Id. at 212-13.
24. 607 F. Supp. 536 (N.D. Ind. 1985), aff'd, 776 F.2d 176 (7th Cir. 1985).
25. 612 F. Supp. 253 (N.D. Ind. 1985), aff'd, 787 F.2d 595 (7th Cir. 1986).
26. The Hilgeford court wrote: "It is, quite simply, an attempt to improve
title by saying it is better. . . . Such self-serving, gratuitous activity does not, cannot
and will not be sufficient by itself to create good title." 607 F. Supp. at 538 (emphasis
in original text).
27. The Hilgeford court wrote:
[Vol. 52
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The court's fears were realized in Nixon with another pro se plaintiff
clutching a "federal land patent" in an attempt to block foreclosure. Again,
the result was a sua sponte dismissal because no federal question was raised
and because the complaint was groundless. Discussing Rule 11 sanctions, the
court noted that the plaintiff in Nixon was given a copy of the Hilgeford
decision and warned of possible sanctions by the court if he persisted. The
court awarded $250 in attorney's fees to each of two defendants. 2
Why were sanctions withheld in Bigalk, but imposed upon pro se plain-
tiffs in Hilgeford and Nixon? It may be that the district court in Minnesota
was simply more tolerant of pro se litigants than the Northern District of
Indiana. Or perhaps the Indiana pro se plaintiffs were more hardheaded and
less contrite in their dealings with the court. Regardless, the essential point
here is that Rule ll's standards were applied to unrepresented parties. The
Bigalk plaintiff failed those standards just as the pro se litigants in Nixon
and Hilgeford failed them. The "discretion" referred to by the Advisory
Committee's Note is not concerned with whether or not unrepresented parties
must be measured by Rule 11.29 They must be. Rather, the court's discretion
is confined to the inherent flexibility of Rule 11's standards and to deciding
which sanctions are appropriate when a party falls short of the standards.
The court's discretion in these areas will be discussed later in this Comment.
Represented parties are not shielded from sanctions simply because their
counsel signs all pleadings, motions, or other papers. Rule 11 expressly pro-
vides that sanctions may be imposed "upon the person who signed it, a
represented party, or both."3 0 Case law has followed that directive, sometimes
imposing sanctions only upon the represented party,31 sometimes only against
the attorney,32 and sometimes imposing sanctions against both the party and
counsel.33
Because this cause constitutes the third quiet title suit filed in this court
within the past month on the basis of a most [sic] identical self-serving land
patents (two of which were filed by these same plaintiffs), the court fears
that other such suits will be filed unless a signal is sent that this court will
not tolerate such obviously frivolous suits based upon documents which on
their face are legal nullities.
Id. at 538-39.
28. Nixon v. Individual Head of St. Joseph Mortgage Co., 612 F. Supp. 253,
256 (N.D. Ind. 1985), aff'd 781 F.2d 595 (7th Cir. 1986)
29. See supra note 20.
30. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
31. Friedgood v. Axelrod, 593 F. Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
32. Taylor v. Belger Cartage Serv., Inc., 102 F.R.D. 172 (W.D. Mo. 1984);
Ring v. R.J. Reynolds Indus., 597 F. Supp. 1277 (N.D. Ill. 1984), aff'd mem., 804
F.2d 143 (7th Cir. 1986); Huettig & Schromm, Inc. v. Landscape Contractors Council,
582 F. Supp. 1519 (N.D. Cal. 1984), aff'd, 790 F.2d 1421 (9th Cir. 1986).
33. Charlton v. Estate of Charlton, 48 Bankr. 1012 (D. Ariz. 1985); Duncan
v. WJLA-TV, Inc., 106 F.R.D. 4 (D.D.C. 1984); Lucha, Inc. v. Goeglein, 575 F.
Supp. 785 (E.D. Mo. 1983).
1987]
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The federal courts have consistently rejected the so-called "mouthpiece
defense" asserted by lawyers claiming that they were only following the
orders of their clients.3 4 In In re TCILtd., sanctions against a lawyer offering
the mouthpiece defense were upheld by the Seventh Circuit: "When lawyers
yield to the temptation to file baseless pleadings to appease clients ... they
must understand that their adversary's fees become a cost of their business. ' 3
(emphasis in original). Thus, Missouri lawyers finding solace in section 514.205,
which exempts attorneys from liability when representing their clients in good
faith, may have to reconsider their obligations in light of Rule 55.03. Section
514.205 provides that when it is determined that civil litigation is conducted
"frivolously and in bad faith," the offending party may be required to pay
the costs incurred by his opponent as a result of the offending conduct.
However, the statute exempts from liability "any attorney representing a
party in the proceeding who in good faith acted at the specific direction of
his client in initiating the case, asserting the defense, filing the motion, or
causing the proceeding to be had."3 6 In effect, section 514.205, enacted in
1985, codified the mouthpiece defense in Missouri.
However, the mouthpiece defense was short-lived. Rule 55.03, taking
effect the following year, removes the mouthpiece defense. Rule 55.03 is a
rule of procedure promulgated by the state supreme court pursuant to au-
thority conferred in the state constitution.3 7 Missouri case law holds that
where a rule promulgated pursuant to constitutional authority conflicts with
an earlier-enacted statute, the rule is controlling. 38 Section 514.205 was en-
acted in 1985. Rule 55.03 took effect in 1986 and is therefore controlling.3 9
The mouthpiece defense was gone in Missouri just a year after being endorsed
by state lawmakers. 40
Just as a lawyer cannot escape Rule lI's reach by claiming he was only
following his client's orders, local counsel simply going through the motions
34. Blair v. Shenandoah Women's Center, Inc., 757 F.2d 1435 (4th Cir. 1985);
In re TCI Ltd., 769 F.2d 441 (7th Cir. 1985); Mohammed v. Union Carbide Corp.,
606 F. Supp. 252 (E.D. Mich. 1985).
35. 769 F.2d at 446 (emphasis in original).
36. Mo. REv. STAT. § 514.205 (1986).
37. The pre-emption is grounded in Article 5, Section 5 of the Missouri Con-
stitution which provides that "[t]he supreme court may establish rules of practice
and procedure for all courts." Mo. CoNsT. art. V, § 5.
38. State v. Collins, 383 S.W.2d 747 (Mo. 1964); State v. King, 380 S.W.2d
370, 375 (Mo. 1964); State ex rel. Bone v. Adams, 365 Mo. 1015, 291 S.W.2d 74
(1956) (en banc).
39. The general assembly could reassert the mouthpiece defense by enacting
legislation subsequent to Rule 55.03. The final sentence of Article 5, Section 5 of the
Missouri Constitution provides: "Any rule may be annulled or amended by a law
limited to the purpose." Mo. CONST. art. V, § 5.
40. One article suggests that Rule 55.03 was, in part, a reaction to Section
514.205's exemption from liability for lawyers. Wilson & Thompson, Continuing on
the Yellow Brick Road, 42 J. Mo. BaR 21, 24 (Jan.-Feb. 1986).
[Vol. 52
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on behalf of another law firm is also asking for trouble. Simply put, it would
be difficult to explain away your responsiblity for a filing which violates
Rule 11 when your signature appears on the filing. In Golden Eagle Distrib-
uting Corp. v. Burroughs Corp. ,'4 the Northern District of California found
that a defendant's motion for dismissal violated Rule 11. The motion was
prepared by an out-of-state firm, but was signed by local counsel. The court
indicated that the local counsel had violated Rule 11 as well as the out-of-
state firm, but withheld monetary sanctions against the local counsel. Instead,
the local counsel was subjected to a stern lecture and was required to certify
that every partner and associate in its firm received a copy of the opinion. 42
Once again, the court's discretion was directed towards the appropriate sanc-
tion after finding a violation of Rule 11 rather than exempting local counsel
from the standards of Rule 11.
Golden Eagle also suggests that attorneys responsible for, but not sign-
ing, an offending filing may face sanctions. The district court imposed sanc-
tions against an out-of-state law firm which acknowledged preparation of
the motion and memorandum signed by local counsel on its behalf.43 On
appeal, the Ninth Circuit found that the attorneys' conduct did not warrant
sanctions under Rule 11. However, the appellate court did not address the
issue of whether sanctions could be imposed against an attorney who did not
sign the petition.44 The district judge who presided in Golden Eagle addressed
this issue in a leading article on Rule 11. 41 Judge William W. Schwarzer
wrote:
The person signing the paper may not necessarily be the one responsible for
it. An associate in a law firm charged with preparing a paper for filing may
be carrying out the instructions of a partner who made the decision to file
it. In such a situation, sanctions are more appropriately imposed on the
principal rather than the agent carrying out his orders, and nothing in this
rule bars its application in that manner."
Judge Schwarzer's observation is in keeping with the spirit of Rule 11, which
provides that sanctions may be imposed upon the person signing a filing,
the person represented, or both. While the represented party would typically
be a client, it takes no formidable leap of logic to conclude that an out-of-
state firm may be represented by local counsel or that a senior partner may
be represented by a young associate signing the filing. All are represented
parties falling within the parameters of Rule 11.
41. 103 F.R.D. 124 (N.D. Cal. 1984), rev'd, 801 F.2d 1531 (9th Cir. 1986).
42. See supra note 20.
43. 103 F.R.D. at 129.
44. 801 F.2d 1531 (9th Cir. 1986).
45. Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the New Federal Rule 11 - A Closer Look,
104 F.R.D. 181 (1985).
46. Id. at 185.
1987]
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In summary, neither Rule 11 nor Rule 55.03 suspend their standards
because a party is or is not represented by counsel or because the party's
signature does not appear on the filing.
B. What Must Measure Up?
Rule 11, like Rule 55.03, expressly encompasses every "pleading, motion,
[or] other paper." 47 The case law of Rule 11 demonstrates the courts' will-
ingness to impose sanctions in a variety of circumstances. While the majority
of cases deal with Rule 11 abuses in the context of pleadings, 48 sanctions
have also been dealt out in connection with motions for summary judgment,49
compliance with a court order,5 0 jurisdictional failures,-1 an expert witness'
lack of credentials 5 2 a motion for civil contempt5 3 a motion for removal,5 4
a motion for dismissal,5 and an offending footnote in a reply brief regarding
a motion to compel production of documents.5 6 As -the paragraph above
illustrates, Rule 11 and Rule 55.03 are concerned with the initiation and
conduct of litigation from beginning to end. Their standards are not relaxed
after pleadings have been filed.
47. FED. R. Crv. P. 11; Mo. R. Crv. P. 55.03.
48. See, e.g., In re TCI Ltd., 769 F.2d 441 (7th Cir. 1985); Eastway Constr.
Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1985); Blair V. Shenandoah
Women's Center, Inc., 757 F.2d 1435 (4th Cir. 1985); Nixon v. Individual Head of
St. Joseph Mortgage Co., 612 F. Supp. 253 (N.D. Ind. 1985), aff'd mem., 787 F.2d
595 (7th Cir. 1986); Fleming Sales Co. v. Bailey, 611 F. Supp. 507 (E.D. Mich. 1985);
Robinson v. C.R. Laurence Co., 105 F.R.D. 567 (D. Colo. 1985); Johnson v. Kut
Kwick, 620 F. Supp. 748 (S.D. Ga. 1984); Ring v. R.J. Reynolds Indus., 597 F.
Supp. 1277 (N.D. Il1. 1984), aff'd mem., 804 F.2d 143 (7th Cir. 1986); Rodgers v.
Lincoln Towing Serv., 596 F. Supp. 13 (N.D. Ill. 1984), aff'd, 771 F.2d 194 (7th
Cir. 1985); Kuzmins v. Employee Transfer Corp., 587 F. Supp. 536 (N.D. Ohio
1984); Dore v. Schultz, 582 F. Supp. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Leema Enter., v. Willi,
582 F. Supp. 255 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Taylor v. Belger Cartage Serv., 102 F.R.D. 172
(W.D. Mo. 1984), aff'd, 762 F.2d 1531 (9th Cir. 1985); Huettig & Schromm, Inc. v.
Landscape Contractors Council, 582 F. Supp. 1519 (N.D. Cal. 1984), aff'd, 790 F.2d
1421 (9th Cir. 1986); Friedgood v. Axelrod, 593 F. Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Viola
Sportswear, Inc. v. Mimun, 574 F. Supp. 619 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
49. SFM Corp. v. Sunstrand Corp., 102 F.R.D. 555 (N.D. 111. 1984).
50. Eavenson, Auchmuty & Greenwald v. Holtzman, 775 F.2d 535 (3d Cir.
1985); Index Fund, Inc. v. Hagopian, 107 F.R.D. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
51. Weisman v. Rivlin, 598 F. Supp. 724 (D.D.C. 1984).
52. Duncan v. WJLA-TV, Inc., 106 F.R.D. 4 (D.D.C. 1984).
53. Westmoreland v. CBS, 770 F.2d 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
54. Davis v. Veslan Enter., 765 F.2d 494 (5th Cir. 1985).
55. Lucha, Inc. v. Goeglein, 575 F. Supp. 785 (E.D. Mo. 1983).
56. AM Int'l, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 39 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan)
433 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
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C. What Are the Standards?
Under the old Rule 11, there was a general consensus that pleadings
would not be struck absent a finding of subjective bad faith.57 The drafters
of new Rule 11 were clearly dissatisfied with the subjective bad faith standard.
The Advisory Committee's note explains that the former Rule 11 "ha[d] not
been effective in deterring abuses" because of "considerable confusion as to
(1) the circumstances that should trigger striking a pleading or motion or
taking disciplinary action, [and] (2) the standard of conduct expected of
attorneys who sign pleadings and motions." 58 The drafters wanted something
other than the vagaries of subjective bad faith alone to be the threshhold
for triggering Rule 11 sanctions.5 9
A review of the language of new Rule 11 (and Rule 55.03) reveals a
two-pronged requirement that a filing be (1) well-grounded in fact and law
after reasonable inquiry, 60 and (2) not interposed for any improper purpose. 6'
The two prongs impose different requirements and measure compliance with
different standards. Both prongs must be satisfied to pass muster under Rule
11. Failure to satisfy either prong subjects the litigant to sanctions. The two
prongs will be discussed separately.
1. The Reasonable Inquiry Prong
The Advisory Committee's note explains that the language of the first
prong is intended to stress "the need for some prefiling inquiry into both
the facts and the law. '" 62 The prefiling inquiry is to be manifested in a filing
that is at least arguably based in law and fact. However, the amount of
57. See, e.g., Badillo v. Central Steel and Wire Co., 717 F.2d 1160 (7th Cir.
1983) (per curiam); Nemeroff v. Abelson, 620 F.2d 339 (2d Cir. 1980), aff'd, 704
F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1983).
58. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note.
59. The Advisory Committee's note explains: "The amended rule attempts to
deal with the problem by building upon and expanding the equitable doctrine per-
mitting the court to award expenses ... to a litigant whose opponent acts in bad
faith in instituting or conducting litigation." FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's
note.
60. Both rules provide that a paper should be filed by a litigant only if "to
the best of his knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry
it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument
for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law." FED. R. Civ. P. 11;
Mo. R. Crv. P. 55.03.
61. The rules provide that the filer's signature (the party or his attorney of
record) certifies that the filing "is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as
to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation."
FED. R. Cirv. P. 11; Mo. R. Civ. P. 55.03.
62. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note.
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prefiling inquiry and ultimately the soundness of the filing will be measured
by a standard of "reasonableness under the circumstances." 63 The test, then,
is an objective one. A party or counsel will be evaluated according to what
a reasonable person would do in that party's shoes. A pure heart, but empty
mind, will not suffice. The Advisory Committee's note warns that the stand-
ard "is more stringent than the original good-faith formula and thus it is
expected that a greater range of tircumstances will trigger its violation.'' 64
Nearly all the courts dealing with the first prong have reached the same
conclusion as the Advisory Committee. Most identify the reasonable inquiry
prong as an objective test,65 and would concur with the district court in
Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing Service, Inc.66 : "[S]ince the standard is one of
reasonableness - an objective standard - it is not relevant that an individual
lawyer might think, on the basis of his own idiosyncratic view of the law,
that it is acceptable for him to assert a claim that no rational pleader would
put forward." 67 The few decisions after August 1, 1983, requiring subjective
bad faith as a condition precedent to Rule 11 sanctions appear to have simply
lost track of the changes of the rule that took effect on that date.68 Some
cases merely represent initial reactions to new Rule 11 which have since been
supplanted by findings of an objective standard in decisions rendered by the
same court.6 9
There is a similar consensus that the reasonable inquiry is to be measured
by what is reasonable under the circumstances.70 The Advisory Committee's
note cautions against the use of hindsight when using that measure; instead,
the court should determine what was reasonable at the time of the filing.7'
The Advisory Committee's note explains:
[W]hat constitutes a reasonable inquiry may depend on such factors as how
much time for investigation was available to the signer; whether he had to
rely on a client for information as to the facts underlying the pleading,
motion, or other paper; whether the pleading, motion, or other paper was
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Indianapolis Colts v. Mayor of Baltimore, 775 F.2d 177 (7th Cir. 1985);
In re TCI Ltd., 769 F.2d 441 (7th Cir. 1985); Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New
York, 762 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1985); Mohammed v. Union Carbide Corp., 606 F.
Supp. 252 (E.D. Mich. 1985).
66. 596 F. Supp. 13 (N.D. Ill. 1984), aff'd, 771 F.2d 194 (7th Cir. 1985).
67. Id. at 27.
68. See Suslick v. Rothschild Sec. Corp., 741 F.2d 1000 (7th Cir. 1984);
Williams v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours Co., 581 F. Supp. 791 (M.D. Tenn. 1983).
69. Suslick v. Rothschild Securities Corp., 741 F.2d 1000 (7th Cir. 1984).
70. See Mohammed v. Union Carbide Corp., 606 F. Supp. 252 (E.D. Mich.
1985); Touchstone v. G.B.Q. Corp., 596 F. Supp. 805 (E.D. La. 1984); Leema Enter.
v. Willi, 582 F. Supp. 255 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Friedgood v. Axelrod, 593 F. Supp. 395
(S.D.N.Y. 1984).
71. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note.
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based on a plausible view of the law; or whether he depended on forwarding
counsel or another member of the bar .2
The standard that emerges is that of the reasonable person in the place of
the litigant, facing the circumstances he faced and hampered by the limita-
tions that limited him. Thus, the objective standard is a flexible one, imposing
a heavier or lighter burden depending upon the resources, expertise, and
preparation time available to the litigant.
A review of the case law shows the courts considering most, if not all,
of the factors suggested by the Advisory Committee's note. An attorney or
other signer of a filing is more likely to have his inquiry deemed "reasonable"
when he necessarily relies on third parties for the underlying facts than when
he relies on third parties for the supporting legal theories. A district court
in Anderson v. Cryovac"3 refused to impose sanctions against an attorney
who, because of the complexity of the scientific facts involved, could not
personally vouch for them. 74 The lawyer assured the court that he had checked
his complaint line by line with a retained expert and was told that the com-
plaint was justified. Similarly, attorney's fees were not imposed upon an
inmate's court-appointed counsel in Friedgood v. Axelrod.7 5 The district court
concluded that the lawyer had reasonably relied upon affidavits obtained
from his client and other inmates, notwithstanding evidence provided to him
by the defense which cast doubt on his client's story. Independent verification
of the inmate's information was not possible given the unique nature of
penal institutions.
However, reliance on a client or a third party might not be reasonable
where the facts are self-evident and corroboration is reasonably obtainable.
In Wold v. Minerals Engineering Co.,76 sanctions were imposed upon attor-
neys who filed a meritless motion to disqualify opposing counsel. The court
found that the lawyers failed to follow up on their client's claim that the
opposing counsel had obtained confidential information about the client while
representing a bank in a matter involving the client's mortgage. 77
On the other hand, represented parties might be given more leeway when
their lawyer is clearly the culprit in offering filings without a basis in law.
The district court in Taylor v. Belger Cartage Service Inc.,78 imposed sanc-
72. Id.
73. 96 F.R.D. 431 (D. Mass. 1983).
74. Cryovac, a 1983 case which was decided prior to the Rule J 1 amendment,
involved a claim that the defendant's contamination of a town water supply caused
leukemia and other health problems. Part of the plaintiffs' case relied upon a report
prepared for the Environmental Protection Agency documenting the existence of
chlorinated solvents in the groundwater. Id. at 432.
75. 593 F. Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
76. 575 F. Supp. 166 (D. Colo. 1983).
77. Id. at 167.
78. 102 F.R.D. 172 (W.D. Mo. 1984), aff'd, 762 F.2d 665 (9th Cir. 1985).
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tions against the attorney, but not his client. The court found that the client
had been reluctant to sue his union, but did so when erroneously advised by
his lawyer that it was a necessary step towards suing his employer. This result
is in keeping with the reasonable person standard of the first prong. The
represented party is accountable for acting not as a reasonable attorney might
act, but rather as a reasonable person might act in deferring to the advice
of counsel. However, both the represented party and his counsel can face
sanctions, even with respect to legal deficiencies, when the party is on notice
that the legal basis is suspect. For example, both attorney and client faced
sanctions in Charlton v. Estate of Charlton,79 where the plaintiff tried to set
aside a sale of real property in a bankrupt estate. The court explained that
all issues raised had been fully litigated in an earlier case and were conse-
quently moot or barred by res judicata, but "[nonetheless, Charlton and
his attorney doggedly went ahead with this action. ' 80 The party, put on
notice by the earlier litigation, had simply hired a new lawyer to mount the
same attack a second time.
The inaccessibility of facts is another factor which might allow a filing
short on details to pass muster under Rule 11. The inaccessibility might be
due to the extreme complexity of the facts themselves, their remoteness in
time or distance from the filer, or because they are in the hands of the
opposing party at the time of filing. For example, the district court would
not allow Rule 11 to be used as a weapon to cut short the litigation in
Touchstone v. G.B.Q. Corp.8 The court concluded that the plaintiff could
not reasonably be expected to know all the facts underlying his claim before
discovery. The case involved events that had occurred as long as twenty-five
years earlier and the principal witness was dead.12 At the same time, the
court noted that the facts should come together to support the filing sometime
after discovery begins or it should be withdrawn. Touchstone underscores
that Rule 11 applies to conduct throughout litigation. It might be reasonable
to initiate litigation, but unreasonable to persist in it when it should be
apparent that the suit is not well-grounded. Mohammed v. Union Carbide
Corp.83 is another case in point. Sanctions were imposed for the plaintiff's
failure to conduct reasonable inquiry into a relatively straightforward defa-
mation claim, but sanctions were rejected with respect to conspiracy and
monopolization claims within the same complaint. The court explained that
Rule 11 was not violated by the filing of the latter claims: "[T]he difficulty
of investigating the conspiracy and monopolization claims prior to the ini-
tiation of the lawsuit lessens the extent of investigative efforts that an attorney
must undertake.... -84
79. 48 Bankr. 1012 (D. Ariz. 1985).
80. Id. at 1015.
81. 596 F. Supp. 805 (E.D. La. 1984).
82. Id. at 810.
83. 606 F. Supp. 252 (E.D. Mich. 1985).
84. Id. at 262.
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In contrast, parties and attorneys are held to a more rigorous require-
ment where facts are readily accessible. A footnote in a reply brief implying
that opposing counsel was a liar, stonewalling discovery, triggered sanctions
in AM International, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.8" The district court held
that reasonable inquiry to back up the implication had not been pursued
because the attorneys failed to take the opportunity to learn the truth when
deposing the witness allegedly kept from them. 86 In Fleming Sales Co., Inc.
v. Bailey,17 sanctions were imposed against a plaintiff who knew the facts
did not support a claim, but kept the claim alive for four months anyway.
A plaintiff in Viola Sportswear, Inc. v. Mimun8 was subjected to sanctions
after filing an action for trademark infringement based solely upon the al-
leged sale of one pair of jeans: "The charge that the ... defendants were
engaged in a nationwide trademark conspiracy ... can hardly be said to be
well grounded in fact. .. 89
Courts applying the reasonable inquiry prong to legal arguments have
generally been more tolerant of claims where the legal issues involved were
relatively complex or ambiguous. In Eavenson, Auchmuty & Greenwald v.
Holtzman,90 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a district judge's
imposition of Rule 11 sanctions after concluding that the attorney sanctioned
had not responded unreasonably to an ambiguous order of the district court. 9'
Similarly, a union member avoided sanctions in Grant v. Burlington
Industries,9 even though the case law and statutes provided no basis for his
claim that a joint employer-union committee did not adequately consider his
grievance. The district court explained that the case law was not so unam-
biguous as to justify sanctions. In Robinson v. C.R. Laurence Co., Inc.,9s
the district court concluded that a claim of conversion based upon a breach
of contract was not so groundless as to warrant sanctions: "Given the oc-
casional blur between concepts of conversion and debt plaintiff's claim is
85. 39 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 433 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
86. Id. at 435.
87. 611 F. Supp. 507 (E.D. Mich. 1985).
88. 574 F. Supp. 619 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
89. Id. at 621.
90. 775 F.2d 535 (3d Cir. 1985).
91. The appellate court in Eavenson wrote:
In our view the district court's order was fully susceptible of the inter-
pretation placed upon it by appellant.... While the district court's inter-
pretation is, of course, just as plausible, we can only conclude that the
Order, which was not accompanied by any further explanation, was ambig-
uous.... We therefore hold that the appellant had reasonable grounds to
believe that his amended complaint was in compliance with the district court's
order at the time it was submitted, and, accordingly that no violation of
Rule 11 could have occurred.
Id. at 544 (emphasis in original text).
92. 3 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (Callaghan) 1289 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
93. 105 F.R.D. 567 (D. Colo. 1985).
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not so meritless as to give rise to an award of fees. ' 94 Sanctions were also
rejected in Leema Enterprises, Inc. v. WiH95 after a complaint against a
foreign bank was dropped for lack of personal jurisdiction. Again, the court
explained that whether personal jurisdiction exists can be complex and con-
fusing.96
Legal arguments clearly sent flying on a wing and a prayer fare worse
under Rule 11. Lawyers filing constitutional claims faced sanctions in Rodg-
ers v. Lincoln Towing Service, Inc.97 The plaintiff in Rodgers had filed a
civil rights complaint against various public and private officials after being
arrested, tried, and acquitted of throwing paint on the building of a towing
company that had towed his car. The court characterized the complaint as
"ponderous, extravagant, and overblown" 98 and condemned its "shotgun
approach" where "the pleader throws a little bit of everything into his com-
plaint in the hope that something will stick." 99
Recall also that pro se plaintiffs in Hilgeford v. Peoples Bank' ° and
Nixon v. Individual Head of St. Joseph Mortgage Co.'01 had sanctions im-
posed upon them for trying to block foreclosure proceedings with purported
land patents drafted by the plaintiffs themselves. The fact that they were
unrepresented by counsel did not excuse so transparent a ploy as conferring
superior titles on themselves by drawing up their own documents. 0 2 A district
court in Barton v. Williams'03 imposed sanctions against an attorney who
knowingly filed a tort action in a court lacking jurisdiction over the defend-
ants. The attorney admitted he had investigated the relevant law and realized
the case had to be filed in the defendants' home state, but nevertheless filed
suit in the plaintiff's home state.' °4
In Index Fund, Inc. v. Hagopian,10 5 sanctions were imposed against an
attorney who amended a complaint to include a ten million dollar claim for
punitive damages without leave of the court. The attorney's action smacked
of contempt of court, but the Southern District of New York couched its
analysis in terms of Rule 11. The court noted that, under the circumstances,
94. Id. at 568.
95. 582 F. Supp. 255 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
96. Id. at 257.
97. 596 F. Supp. 13 (N.D. Ill. 1984), aff'd, 771 F.2d 194 (7th Cir. 1985).
98. Id. at 22.
99. Id. at 27.
100. 776 F.2d 176 (7th Cir. 1985) (per curiam).
101. 612 F. Supp. 253 (N.D. Ind. 1985), aff'd mem., 787 F.2d 595 (7th Cir.
1986).
102. The Nixon court wrote: "Any pro se litigant who can read or write knows
that one cannot give oneself better title to land by simply saying so on a piece of
paper." Id. at 254.
103. 38 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 966 (N.D. Ohio 1983).
104. Id. at 968.
105. 107 F.R.D. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
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Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure required court approval
of the additional claims."06 Amending the complaint without the court's per-
mission flew in the face of Rule 15(a). Therefore, the amendment was not
warranted by existing law and thus violated Rule 11.107
Similar reasoning was used with respect to Rule 30(b)(4) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure'018 in Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc.1' 9 In Westmore-
land, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed a district
court and imposed sanctions upon a party seeking a contempt order against
a deponent who refused to be videotaped. The appellate court pointed out
that the party seeking the contempt order had initially failed to take the steps
required by Rule 30(b)(4) before videotaping a deposition. Thus, the party
failed the reasonable inquiry prong of Rule 11. Without the required com-
pliance with Rule 30(b)(4), the party "had absolutely no reasonable basis in
law or in fact" for seeking a contempt order against the recalcitrant depo-
nent. 110 The appellate court imposed Rule 11 sanctions for what might be
described as a procedural error in Westmoreland, just as the district court
did in Hagopian. In summary, the case law supports an objective standard"'
106. Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in pertinent
part:
A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course at any time
before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is one to which no
responsive pleading is -permitted and the action has not been placed upon
the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 20 days after it
is served. Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by leave of court
or by written consent of the adverse party.
FED. R. Crv. P. 15 (emphasis added).
107. 107 F.R.D. 95, 99 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
108. Rule 30(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides in pertinent
part: "The parties may stipulate in writing or the court may upon motion order that
the testimony at a deposition be recorded by other than stenographic means." FED.
R. Civ. P. 30(b)(4).
109. 770 F.2d 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
110. Id. at 1177.
111. Some decisions suggest that there might be a subjective element within
the objective standard of the first prong. Rule 11 directs a court to consider whether
litigants made a "good faith" argument for the modification, extension, or reversal
of existing law. Dicta in Pudlo v. Director, I.R.S., 587 F. Supp. 1010 (N.D. Ill.
1984), asserts that "Rule 11 is objective in its application except to the extent a
litigant argues for a change in the law." Id. at 1011 (emphasis added). Other decisions
suggest that the "good faith" terminology is swallowed up by the objective standard
of the first prong. Several of these decisions simply state that the first prong imposes
an objective standard without specific references to the "good faith" clause. Indi-
anapolis Colts v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 3 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (Callaghan)
51 (7th Cir. 1985); In re Ronco, Inc., 105 F.R.D. 493 (N.D. Ill. 1985), appeal
dismissed mem., 793 F.2d 1295 (7th Cir. 1986); Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing Serv.,
Inc., 596 F. Supp. 13 (N.D. Ill. 1984), aff'd, 771 F.2d 194 (7th Cir. 1985). Some
decisions go further, pointedly rejecting claims that a filing was based on a "good
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of reasonableness under the circumstances when measuring conduct against
the reasonable inquiry prong." 2 The inquiry is not limited to the eventual
success or failure of the pleading, motion, or other paper. For example, the
mere fact that a complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim does not
make the attorney liable for sanctions under the reasonable inquiry prong.
Also to be considered are those factors affecting the filer's ability to rea-
sonably inquire at the time of the filing. The circumstances considered have
included the accessibility of facts, the relative complexity or ambiguity of
legal issues, the degree to which reliance upon third parties is required, and
the point to which the litigation has progressed. An evaluation of surrounding
circumstances is inherently part of an objective standard, and can be expected
to be included in the analysis of Missouri courts when implementing the
reasonable inquiry prong of Rule 55.03.
2. The Improper Purpose Prong
There is some disagreement regarding the standard, or at least the de-
scription of the standard, to be applied in determining whether a filing has
been "interposed for any improper purpose.""' The Advisory Committee's
note discusses the reasonableness standard of the reasonable inquiry prong
at length, but say little about a standard for measuring improper purpose.
It might be suggested that reasonableness under the circumstances should be
applied to both standards, but that seems like a contradiction in terms. How
can an "improper purpose" be reasonable under any circumstances?
faith" argument. For example, a meritless claim in Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles,
590 F. Supp. 852 (C.D. Cal. 1984), rev'd, 780 F.2d 823 (9th Cir. 1986) drew sanctions
even though filers claimed the issues raised were novel. The Zaldivar court wrote:
"This Court has already dismissed any subjective bad faith requirement and a claim
does not rise to the level of being novel when it clearly has no legal support." Id.
at 857. In reversing the decision because the opposing side was not harassed within
the meaning of Rule 11, the court of appeals stated that a finding of bad faith was
not required in order to justify the imposition of sanctions. 780 F.2d at 829. Similarly,
a defendant in SFM Corp. v. Sunstrand Corp., 102 F.R.D. 555 (N.D. Ill. 1984),
tried to avoid sanctions by claiming it "believed" its argument had a reasonable basis.
The district court imposed sanctions, explaining that "subjective belief is not the
standard for determining the propriety of Rule 11 sanctions." Id. at 557. The tenor
of these decisions implies what Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762
F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1985), expressly states: "[W]here no reasonable argument can be
advanced to extend, modify or reverse the law as it stands, Rule 11 has been violated."
Id. at 254 (emphasis added). Under these decisions, the "good faith" referred to in
the first prong is synonymous with "reasonable" and is measured by an objective
standard.
112. For a discussion of the obligations that "reasonable inquiry" imposes
upon lawyers, see Rothschild, Fenton, & Swanson, Rule 11: Stop, Think, and In-
vestigate, 11 LIIGATION 13 (Winter 1985).
113. FED. R. Crv. P. 11.
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Some courts consider the second prong to be nothing more than the
traditional subjective bad faith standard of former Rule 11 incorporated into
the new Rule 11."1 The Northern District of Illinois, which has been partic-
ularly active in cases involving Rule 11, adopted this view in In re Ronco."5
The district court described two separate standards for the two prongs of
Rule 11: "What an attorney is deemed to certify is both (1) his or her
'knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry' - an
objective test - and (2) the absence of any 'improper purpose' - a subjective
test that supported the old 'bad faith' requirement." 6
In contrast, Judge Schwarzer of the Northern District of California
disdains talk of subjective bad faith in applying any part of Rule 11. In his
article on the amended rule,"7 Judge Schwarzer points out that the text of
Rule 11 itself makes no reference to bad faith in connection with the improper
purpose prong, and concludes that reliance on "bad faith" terminology is
inappropriate in Rule 11 analysis." 8 Judge Schwarzer maintains that a court
considering improper purpose need not be concerned with the filer's subjec-
tive intent:
The record in the case and all of the surrounding circumstances should afford
an adequate basis for determining whether particular papers or proceedings
caused delay that was unnecessary, whether they caused increase in the cost
of litigation that was needless, or whether they lacked any apparent legiti-
mate purpose. Findings on these points would suffice to support an inference
of improper purpose."19
Two observations can be made concerning Judge Schwarzer's analysis. First,
if he is equating any action causing unnecessary delay or needless expense
with improper purpose, then the second prong is superfluous. If an objective
standard is applied uniformly throughout Rule 11, when will there be a
violation of the first prong that is not also a violation of the second prong,
and vice versa? If a filing is well-grounded in fact and law, the circumstances
that would render it violative of an objective improper purpose prong are
difficult to imagine. What judge, limited to objective standards, is prepared
to sanction parties for proper procedural moves unassailable on their legal
and factual basis? All filed pleadings, motions, or other papers cause expense
and delay. Under a purely objective test, they only become needless upon a
finding that they are not well grounded in law or fact after reasonable inquiry
114. In re TCI, Ltd., 769 F.2d 441 (7th Cir. 1985); In re Ronco, 105 F.R.D.
493 (N.D. Ill. 1985), appeal dismissed mem., 793 F.2d 1295 (7th Cir. 1986).
115. 105 F.R.D. 493 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
116. Id. at 495.
117. Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the New Rule 11 -A Closer Look, 104 F.R.D.
181 (1985).
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- returning us to the reasonable inquiry test already articulated in the first
prong of Rule 11.
Second, if actions causing needless delay and expense merely support an
inference of improper purpose, then Judge Schwarzer is engaged in an ex-
ercise in semantics. 20 His protests to the contrary notwithstanding, the im-
proper purpose prong is, in fact, aimed at subjective bad faith. Judge
Schwarzer's reluctance to carry forward the baggage of the largely ineffectual
old Rule 11 - with its focus exclusively on subjective bad faith - is under-
standable, but substituting the terms "improper purpose" for "bad faith"
changes nothing. Even the old Rule 11 did not require courts to read minds
or elicit confessions before finding subjective bad faith. 121 Rather, bad faith
was inferred from the surrounding circumstances, just as Judge Schwarzer
infers improper purpose from surrounding circumstances. 122 In short, the
analysis is identical, irrespective of whether the target is dubbed improper
purpose or bad faith. Judge Schwarzer may be ferreting out "improper
purpose" while other courts use the more familiar bad faith terminology,
but everyone is aiming at the same thing. Everyone is finding violations the
way they have always been found - by inferring them from the surrounding
circumstances.
The best path may be a middle course between championing a purely
objective test and merely resurrecting the bad faith terminology. The courts
might be wise to abandon the latter for the "improper purpose" terminology
of Rule 11, but should not forget that the target remains a subjective state
of mind that is inferred from objective circumstances. Such a compromise
would not rob Rule 11 of its effectiveness, and would not leave it to the fate
of its predecessor. The old rule had only a subjective bad faith test. Rule 11
is not so limited now. The first prong with its objective standard is still in
place and "a greater range of circumstances will trigger its violation."' 23
However, the new Rule 11 was designed to build upon the base of
subjective bad faith rather than to replace it.124 The improper purpose prong
120. This appears to be a more plausible reading of Judge Schwarzer's com-
ments.
121. In Nemeroff v. Abelson, 620 F.2d 339 (2d Cir. 1980), aff'd, 704 F.2d
652 (2d Cir. 1983), the Second Circuit explained the criteria for a finding of bad
faith: "[T]here must be 'clear evidence' that the claims are 'entirely without color
and made for reasons of harassment or delay or for other improper purposes."' Id.
at 348 (quoting Browning Debenture Holders' Comm. v. DASA Corp., 560 F.2d
1078, 1088 (2d Cir. 1977).
122. Schwarzer, supra note 45, at 195 (1985).
123. FED. R. Crv. P. 11 advisory committee's note.
124. The Advisory Committee's note concurs: "The amended rule attempts to
deal with the problem by building upon and expanding the equitable doctrine per-
mitting the court to award expenses, including attorney's fees, to a litigant whose
opponent acts in bad faith in instituting or conducting litigation." FED. R. Crv. P.
11 advisory committee's note.
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is a second line of defense against abusive litigation tactics, serving notice
that even objectively reasonable filings will not insulate parties and lawyers
with improper purposes from Rule 11. Subjective bad faith becomes "im-
portant only when the suit is objectively colorable."' The Advisory Com-
mittee's note says "references in the former text to wilfulness as a prerequisite
to disciplinary action have been deleted.' ' 2 6 That is undeniably correct. Ob-
jective unreasonableness will now suffice because of the first prong. However,
the present rule should not be read to remove wilful misconduct as grounds
for sanctions in those circumstances where the filings are objectively reason-
able on their face. To do so would leave litigants vulnerable to any number
of well grounded but manifestly improper attacks. That is something not
even the previous Rule 11 would tolerate. The current Rule 11 was meant
to build upon rather than replace the subjective bad faith standard its pred-
ecessor targeted.
The growing case law has yet to delve into the improper purpose prong
as extensively as the discussion above. There is no raging debate over whether
improper purpose is the equivalent of subjective bad faith. However, the
case law generally follows the analytical framework of inferring a violation
of the second prong from the surrounding circumstances. In McLaughlin v.
Bradlee,2 7 the district court never reached the question of whether bad faith
or simply objective unreasonableness was the threshhold for triggering Rule
11 sanctions because it found bad faith in any event. More importantly in
the present context, its finding of bad faith was predicated on inferences
drawn from objectively observed circumstances. The court was uncertain
whether a meritless motion in and of itself violated Rule 11, but the cu-
mulative effect of repeated baseless filings convinced the court that "har-
assment" was the subjective intent of the plaintiff. 28 A similar approach
found support in Davis v. Veslan Enterprises,129 where the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals upheld sanctions against a defendant who filed a petition for
removal from state court. The petition was filed just one day before a hearing
on the plaintiff's motion for a judgment on the verdict. The appellate court
looked at circumstances beyond the objective merits of the defendant's mo-
tion:
Under the existing state of law in Texas at the time of the removal petition,
Wagner's petition for removal delayed entry of the state court judgment and
would have saved Wagner a substantial amount of interest if sanctions had
not been imposed. This circumstance, coupled with the lack of plausibility
of Wagner's argument, made it reasonable for the district court to infer that
125. In re TCI, Ltd., 796 F.2d 441, 445 (7th Cir. 1985).
126. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note.
127. 602 F. Supp. 1412 (D.D.C. 1985).
128. Id. at 1417.
129. 765 F.2d 494 (5th Cir. 1985).
1987]
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one purpose of the removal petition was to delay entry of the state court
judgment.13°
The Davis decision, too, rested in part on inferences beyond the four corners
of the filing to find an improper purpose.
Lack of candor resulted in sanctions against a plaintiff's counsel in
Silverman v. Center.' The pleadings in Silverman were plausible, but the
attorney failed to tell the district court that there had been earlier proceedings
in state court on the same issue and that an earlier application to stay ar-
bitration had been denied.1 2 The court concluded that the lawyer's "lack of
candor" indicated bad faith and an intentional abuse of court procedures. 33
The second prong of Rule I 1 (and Rule 55.03) is violated when a court
finds enough circumstantial evidence to infer that the party or counsel is
abusing the litigation process. This subjective standard is separate and apart
from the objective standard of the first prong, but is necessarily measured
by objective manifestations of subjective intent. It will probably be found
violated more sparingly as courts give litigants the benefit of the doubt in
inferring a subjective state of mind, irrespective of whether it is labeled bad
faith or improper purpose. However, it is available to trigger sanctions against
those parties found acting for an improper purpose who would otherwise
escape sanctions for objectively reasonable filings. 34
III. Ti SANCTIONS
A reading of the text of both Rule 11 and Rule 55.03 might lead one
to the conclusion that sanctions automatically follow if the standards dis-
cussed above are violated. The final sentence of both the state and federal
rules provides, in pertinent part: "If a pleading, motion, or other paper is
signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own
initiative, shall impose . . . an appropriate sanction.' 35 (emphasis added).
Indeed, a number of decisions interpreting this language have concluded that
sanctions are mandatory once a violation is found. 36 A footnote in Eastway
Construction Corp. v. City of New York 37 is typical of the rationale offered:
130. Id. at 500 (emphasis added).
131. 1 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (Callaghan) 1128 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
132. Id. at 1130.
133. Id. at 1131.
134. Schwarzer, supra note 45.
135. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
136. Westmoreland v. CBS, 770 F.2d 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Eastway Constr.
Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1985); Johnson v. Kut Kwick,
620 F. Supp. 748 (S.D. Ga. 1984); Weisman v. Rivlin, 598 F. Supp. 724 (D.D.C.
1984); Huettig & Schromm, Inc. v. Landscape Contractors Council, 582 F. Supp.
1519 (N.D. Cal. 1984), aff'd, 790 F.2d 1421 (9th Cir. 1986).
137. 762 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1985).
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"By employing the imperative 'shall' we believe the drafters intended to stress
the mandatory nature of the sanctions pursuant to the rule .... Accordingly,
where strictures of the rule have been transgressed, it is incumbent upon the
district court to fashion proper sanctions."' 138 However, it is a mistake to
conclude that the courts have no discretion regarding the imposition of sanc-
tions. A survey of the case law reveals that the district courts have, to varying
degrees, retained discretion in imposing Rule 11 sanctions.
Most obviously, the courts have discretion with regard to which sanctions
to impose. The rule itself does not specify the sanctions that should be
imposed for violations. It only suggests that sanctions "may include an order
to pay to the other party or parties the amount of reasonable expenses
incurred because of the filing . . . including a reasonable attorney's fee."' 13 9
The Advisory Committee's note is equally deferential, noting that a court
"has discretion to tailor sanctions to the particular facts of the case.'
140
Acknowledging this deferential language,' 4 ' the courts have exercised their
discretion in a number of ways.
Some courts have been content to stay within the framework suggested
by the rule, using discretion to determine only what dollar amounts will
compensate the opposing party for its reasonable expenses. Consequently, a
party whose misbehavior causes only minor costs and inconvenience might
face nominal sanctions. 142 However, the costs of sloppy litigation can be
prohibitive where the opposing party is seriously inconvenienced. 143 In Davis
138. Id. at 254 n.7.
139. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
140. FED. R. Crv. P. 11 advisory committee's note.
141. "The Rule's provision that the court 'shall impose' sanctions for motions
abuses thus concentrates the district court's discretion on the selection of an appro-
priate sanction rather than on the decision to impose sanctions." Westmoreland v.
CBS, Inc., 770 F.2d 1168, 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (emphasis in original text); "This
language indicates that courts are not duty bound by Rule l1's directive to impose
sanctions." Baranski v. Serhant, 106 F.R.D. 247, 250 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
142. Hilgeford v. Peoples Bank, 607 F. Supp. 536 (N.D. Ind. 1985), aff'd, 776
F.2d 176 (7th Cir. 1985) ($250 sanction imposed where quiet title action was based
on meritless "federal land patent"); Index Fund, Inc. V. Hagopian, 107 F.R.D. 95
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) ($100 sanction imposed upon an attorney who amended his complaint
to include punitive damages without court approval); Dore v. Schultz, 582 F. Supp.
154 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) ($200 fine for lawyer who filed baseless claims against federal
officials on behalf of a woman whose son was taken out of the country by his father);
Weisman v. Rivlin, 598 F. Supp. 724 (D.D.C. 1984) ($200 sanction against plaintiffs
for filing complaint lacking diversity jurisdiction); Kuzmins v. Employee Transfer
Corp., 587 F. Supp. 536 (N.D. Ohio 1984) ($100 sanction for filing complaint with
no supporting authority cited); Barton v. Williams, 38 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan)
966 (N.D. Ohio 1983) ($250 sanction where lawyer knowingly filed tort action in
district court lacking personal jurisdiction over defendants).
143. Davis v. Veslan Enter., 765 F.2d 494 (5th Cir. 1985) ($5,855 in attorney's
fees and $32,988.99 for lost interest when meritless removal petition delayed entry
25
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v. Veslan Enterprises'44 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district
court's imposition of $5,855 in attorney's fees and $32,988.99 as the amount
of interest lost when the defendant's meritless removal petition delayed entry
of the state court judgment. 4S In Westmoreland v. CBS Inc. ,46 the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia included the appellant's costs of
appealing an adverse decision on his Rule 11 motion by the lower court. 47
The Westmoreland court explained:
[I]t is very possible that appellate expenses might exceed substantially the
sanction in the district court, thus forcing many litigants to conclude that
the vindication of the Rule 11 interest is not worth the candle. . . . Given
this, we find it hard to believe that the drafters of the Rule intended ap-
pellants . . . to bear their own appellate costs necessary to correct the error
of appellees' ways.'1
However, the "reasonably incurred" language does not always work out to
the injured party's advantage, at least not to the extent they would like. In
Weisman v. Rivlin,149 the party seeking sanctions wanted several thousand
dollars, but came away with only $200. The district court found that the
hours claimed by the injured party far exceeded what should have been
necessary to point out that the claim lacked diversity jurisdiction. 150
District courts applying Rule 11 are not limited to monetary sanctions.
A case from the Northern District of California illustrates this point. In
addition to monetary sanctions, Judge Schwarzer required that a copy of the
decision be given to every partner and associate in the offending attorneys'
of state judgment); Eavenson, Auchmuty & Greenwald v. Holtzman, 775 F.2d 535
(3d Cir. 1985) (appeals court overturned sanctions of $1,642.50 after finding that
attorney acted reasonably in responding to court order); Duncan v. WJLA-TV, Inc.,
106 F.R.D. 4 (D.D.C. 1984) ($1,155 sanction imposed for failure to check into expert
witness' credentials); Huettig & Schromm, Inc. v. Landscape Contractors Council,
582 F. Supp. 1519 (N.D. Cal. 1984), aff'd, 790 F.2d 1421 (9th Cir. 1986) ($5,625
sanction against law firm for meritless complaint against a pendent party defendant).
144. 765 F.2d 494 (5th Cir. 1985).
145. The latter amount was based upon a ten percent interest rate calculated
from the original date for entry of the state court judgment to the date that the
district court remanded the case back to the state court eighteen days later. Thus,
any monetary benefit that the defendant gained by delaying entry of the state courtjudgment was offset by the sanctions imposed. Id. at 501.
146. 770 F.2d 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
147. In this case, the appellant was awarded appellate costs incurred in the
vindication of his rights. This should be distinguished from the scenario contemplated
by Rule 84.19 of the Missouri Rules of Civil Procedure where the appellee is com-
pensated for costs incurred by the other party's frivolous appeal.
148. 770 F.2d at 1179.
149. 598 F. Supp. 724 (D.D.C. 1984).
150. The Weisman court noted that "the rule requires that the work expended
be causally linked to the improperly filed paper." Id. at 726.
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law firm in Huettig & Schromm, Inc. v. Landscape Contractors Council. "I
The broadest exercise of discretion is found in those cases where no
sanctions were imposed. These decisions found a Rule 11 violation, but then
declined to impose sanctions when convinced that the violations were incon-
sequential. Most directly on point is the Northern District of Illinois' holding
in Baranski v. Serhant'5 2 that a "mistake can be a defense to Rule 11."' 3
In declining to impose sanctions for the inadvertent signing of time-barred
amended complaints, the district court listed a number of considerations that
went into its decision. First, the court noted that the opposing party had
conceded that the violation was inadvertent, but then rejected the opposing
party's further contention that since the mistake "was one growing out of
a failure to comply with affirmative obligations under Rule 11 to make
reasonable inquiry ... mistake was no defense. 1 1 54 Enlisting the language
of the Advisory Committee's note as support (courts have discretion to tailor
sanctions), the Baranski court reasoned that "courts are not duty bound by
Rule 1l's directive to impose sanctions."'-5
Second, the district court in Baranski found that little harm had been
incurred by the opposing party as a result of the mistake. Little time or
effort was expended in getting the complaints dismissed: "[T]he matter might
easily have been handled through a telephone call or letter, rather than by
motion."' 5 6
Finally, the Baranski court described the real purpose of Rule 11 as
deterrence of abusive pleading and motion practices. The court continued,
"Under the circumstances of this case, where it is undisputed that a mistake
has occurred, and being intimately familiar with the facts, the parties, and
the lawyers involved, the court does not believe that the spirit of Rule 11
would be served by imposition of sanctions .... "'M5
The Baranski "honest mistake" exception could have the effect of taking
two steps forward and one (or two) steps back. It suggests that while sub-
jective bad faith is not the sole standard for gauging Rule 11 abuses, sub-
jective bad faith remains the only legitimate target. Under this view, the
"reasonable inquiry" prong might be a handy tool for nailing a party or
attorney guilty of bad faith, but "reasonable inquiry" is not an end in itself.
How does a court distinguish between honest and dishonest mistakes? Even
posing the question moves the inquiry back to a single standard of subjective
bad faith and away from the interpretation given the "reasonable inquiry"
prong in In re TCI Ltd.:
151. 582 F. Supp. 1519 (N.D. Cal. 1984), aff'd, 790 F.2d 1421 (9th Cir. 1986).
152. 106 F.R.D. 247 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
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If a lawyer pursues a path that a reasonably careful attorney would have
known, after appropriate inquiry, to be unsound, the conduct is objectively
unreasonable and vexatious. To put this a little differently, a lawyer engages
in bad faith by acting recklessly or with indifference to the law, as well as
by acting in the teeth of what he knows to be the law.'1'
Perhaps the Baranski case can be explained as the district court's response
to the insignificant harm incurred by the opposing party. Limited to its facts,
it is perhaps defensible. However, the rationale offered by the court is much
broader, and the Baranski decision - though perhaps the clearest articulation
of the "honest mistake" defense - is not an isolated case. Decisions from
the various circuits have excused filings with little or no basis in fact or law,
and have noted the filer's good intentions as part of their rationale. 159 While
the discussion devoted to good faith in many of these decisions might be
dismissed as no more than afterthoughts after the courts had already found
no violation of the reasonable inquiry standard, the Baranski court read the
decisions differently:
A survey of the case law indicates that courts are objectively assessing the
gravity of the conduct at issue before imposing sanctions. Where there is a
deliberate abuse or misuse of the litigation process, sanctions are almost
universally imposed. [Citation omitted.] Where conduct is inadvertent in
nature, courts have exercised their sound discretion in declining to award
sanctions.' o
Whether the patterns identified above are representative of the case law is
open to debate. Indeed, In re Ronco,'6' decided the same year and by the
same court as Baranski, puts much less emphasis on good intentions:
"[T]hough 'improper purpose' could well be an aggravating factor under the
revised Rule, its absence does not insulate from sanctions the lawyer who
fails the alternative objective standard."' 62 Perhaps the only tenable conclu-
sion at this point is that the case law seems unsettled and contradictory at
times. To the extent that good intentions excuse violations of the objective
portion of Rule 11, the effectiveness of the rule is unjustifiably limited.
Opposing parties can be harmed both by intentional abuses and inadvertent
mistakes in the litigation process. The text of the rule and the Advisory
Committee's note leaves little doubt that Rule 11 (and now Rule 55.03) was
intended to curb both.
158. Id. at 445.
159. "[P]laintiff's willingness to confess judgment to the motion adds further
support to his claim that he did not act vexatiously or in bad faith." Robinson v.
C.R. Laurence Co., 105 F.R.D. 567, 568 (D. Colo. 1985); "The court declines to
impose sanctions in this instance, however. At the hearing, the Bigalks showed their
efforts were sincere." Bigalk v. Fed. Land Bank Ass'n of Rochester, 107 F.R.D.
210, 213 (D. Minn. 1985).
160. Baranski v. Serhant, 106 F.R.D. 247, 250 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
161. 105 F.R.D. 493 (N.D. II1. 1985).
162. Id. at 498.
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Predictions regarding the interpretation to be given Rule 55.03 based on
the track record of Rule 11 need to be qualified from the outset. Rule 11,
too, is relatively new on the scene and consequently the case law interpreting
it is far from settled on every point. However, some conclusions may be
drawn regarding the direction that the federal courts have taken thus far and
the path that Missouri courts can be expected to follow in applying Rule
55.03. First, Rule 55.03 applies to all parties and their attorneys in litigation.
Each is measured by the standards of Rule 55.03, whether their signatures
appear on the filing or not. Furthermore, lawyers will not escape sanctions
by reliance on the "mouthpiece defense." Additionally, a lawyer is personally
responsible for any pleading, motion, or other paper he signs.
Second, Rule 55.03 applies to the conduct of litigation throughout the
proceedings. The standards are not relaxed after pleadings are filed. They
apply with equal force to any motions or papers filed with the court during
the course of the litigation.
Third, two separate prongs with two separate standards are found in
Rule 55.03. The first prong, requiring reasonable inquiry into the facts and
law upon which the the filing is based, is an objective standard measured by
what is reasonable under the circumstances. Thus, while all parties are subject
to the same standard, that standard is flexible and may be higher or lower
depending upon the limitations and circumstances facing the "reasonable
man." The second prong is a subjective standard under which improper
purpose (or subjective bad faith) may be inferred from the circumstances
surrounding the filing.
Fourth, while the "mandatory" language in the final sentence of Rule
55.03 certainly encourages sanctions in the strongest possible terms, the amount
and types of sanctions are left to the discretion of the trial court.
This Comment began with a query, asking whether good intentions are
no longer good enough to pass muster in light of Rule 55.03. For the moment,
the answer is that good intentions alone will not suffice. A litigant with the
best intentions can still run afoul of the objective standard of the first prong.
However, whether that will continue to be the answer depends upon
how successfully Missouri circuit courts resist the temptation to withhold
sanctions for what they intuitively conclude are "honest mistakes." Such an
undercurrent is already apparent in some federal court decisions, and could
completely wash away the objective standards of Rule 55.03 in state circuit
courts where the bench and the practitioners before it are inevitably better
acquainted. Understandably, it may be difficult for the circuit judge to im-
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The temptation should be resisted. The two prongs of Rule 55.03 com-
bine to provide an effective deterrent to abusive and ill founded litigation.
However, exclusive reliance on either prong in weighing the imposition of
sanctions could render Rule 55.03 ineffectual.
RONALD K. MEDIN
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